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We consider a model where a judgment-proof Þrm needs Þnance to
realize a project. This project might cause an environmental hazard with
a probability that is the private knowledge of the Þrm. Thus there is
asymmetric information with respect to the environmental riskiness of the
project. We consider the implications of a simple joint and strict liability
rule on the lender and the Þrm where, in case of a damage, the lender
is responsible for that part of the liability which the judgment-proof Þrm
cannot pay. We use a weighted version of the neutral bargaining solution
(Myerson 1983 / 1984) to determine the Þnancial contract between the
lender and the Þrm. In the given model we show that either full or a
punitive liability is optimal.
Keywords: judgement proofness, extended liability, neutral bargaining so-
lution.
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1 Introduction
Liability rules are an important element in many systems of law. Liability laws
are appealing to practitioners because they are easy and seemingly costless to
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1much a matter of debate, in particular when one of the parties concerned can
be judgement-proof. A Þrm becomes judgment proof if the damage costs of
an environmental accident caused by the Þrm exceeds her own capital base. For
such cases many countries considered the introduction of extended liability where
lenders to such Þrms can be made liable for the residual damage costs which the
Þrm cannot pay (see Boyer and La ont (1997)). Starting with Pitchford (1995),
Heyes (1996) and Boyer and La ont (1997) a growing literature has studied the
incentive e ects of extended liability. Pitchford (1995) and Boyer and La ont
(1997) study the impact on the incentives of Þrms to prevent accidents. Boyer
and La ont (1997) also consider the role of private information with respect to
the proÞtability of projects. Heyes (1996) studies a model with adverse selection
concerning the environmental riskiness of projects and with moral hazard in re-
gard to the e orts Þrms invest to prevent accidents. Boyer and La ont as well
as Hayes assume that the lender has all the bargaining power when selecting the
lending contract. However, this is at odds with much of the Þnance literature
where lenders are typically assumed to make zero proÞts. As shown in Balken-
borg (2001) assumptions about the bargaining power a lender has vis-a-vis a Þrm
when bargaining on a loan contract can be crucial when evaluating the impact
of extended liability.
This paper determines the optimal extended liability rule for the adverse se-
lection problem that arises when the Þrm has private information on the accident
probability of the project she seeks to get Þnanced. We will use the same base
model as used in Balkenborg (2001) to study moral hazard, except that the prob-
ability of an environmental accident does not depend on the e ort of the Þrm,
but is exogenously given and known only to the Þrm.
The comparative statics result for the moral hazard model and for our adverse
selection model could not be more di erent. A joint analysis of the moral hazard
and the adverse selection problem in a single model promises hence to be rather
subtle and is not attempted here.
The Þrst di erence concerns the question whether social welfare is higher
when the lender or when the Þrm has all the bargaining power. In the moral
hazard model the accident probability is decreasing in the bargaining power of
the lender. A monopoly lender is the worst-case scenario because a monopoly
lender extracting all the surplus from the project is bad for the incentives of the
Þrm to take care (see Balkenborg (2001), Shavell (1997)).
In contrast, only a monopoly lender guarantees a Þrst-best outcome in the
adverse selection case. In our model, a monopoly lender is able to extract all the
surplus, regardless of the private knowledge of the Þrm. Hence a Þrm who knows
that the accident probability of her project is high cannot gain by pretending to
have a low accident probability. Therefore high-risk projects do not jeopardize
low-risk projects, the potential distortions due to adverse selection do not arise
and Þrst best can be achieved. As soon as the Þrm can capture some of the
surplus, adverse selection causes distortions away form Þrst best.
2The second di erence concerns the optimal joint liability. If the Þrm has all
the bargaining power it is in the moral hazard model never socially optimal to
use the deep pockets of the lender. The lender should contribute zero to the
damage costs (see Pitchford (1995)). In the adverse selection model, however,
not only should the lender contribute to the damage costs, but the overall joint
liability imposed on Þrm and lender should typically exceed the actual damage
costs (the joint liability should be “punitive”). Conversely, when the lender has
all the bargaining power, the optimal liability is punitive in the moral hazard
model but full joint liability (i.e., a joint liability equal to the actual damage
costs) is optimal in the adverse selection case.
The distortion in our adverse selection model is, in essence, due to signalling.
Bargaining should settle on a contract where it is not possible for low-risk types of
the Þrm to propose an alternative contract that harms high-risk types and makes
low-risk types of the Þrm and the lender better o . Such alternative contracts,
if o ered, would not lead the lender to conclude that he is facing a high-risk
type and would hence be accepted. This would destabilize the initial agreement.
Considerations of this type lead in our model to the selection of the contract
that maximizes the expected payo  of the type of Þrm with the lowest accident
probability subject to the constraint that the lender gets a Þxed share of the
maximal joint surplus.1 This contract is shown to be typically an option contract
with three di erent options.2
1. The Þrst option is to run the project and give a high share of the surplus
to the Þrm when no accident occurs and nothing when an accident occurs.
This option favors low-risk types of the Þrm. In equilibrium it is taken up
by those Þrms for whom the project promises (after taking account of the
joint liability) a surplus in expectation.
2. The second option is a compensation payment to prevent Þrms with a high
accident probability from running the project. This is necessary here be-
cause Þrms are assumed to have no own wealth and can hence only gain from
running the project.3 In equilibrium, this option is taken by the high-risk
types of the Þrm for whom the project would yield a loss in expectation.
3. There is a third option where the project is only run with a small probability.
The third option is for the medium-risk types of the Þrm for whom the
project yields a loss in expectation but where it is cheaper to have them run
1I skip here the case of a joint liability that the Þrm could pay on its own.
2In the formal model we work with “direct mechanisms” where the Þrm Þrst announces the
accident probability of her project and a neutral mediator then selects the option.
3To have such “bribes” in a loan contract may seem odd at Þrst, but all it means is that
the lender Þnances a nice new o ce and a rather decent salary to the owner / manager that
does not have to be paid back if the Þrm later (after some further costly “research”) decides to
withdraw from the project.
3the project than to pay them a compensation for staying out of business.
They would have to be given a higher compensation than the high-risk
types. However, this higher compensation, if o ered, would be taken by
all high-risk types as well. The total expected payment for bribes could
become so high that the surplus available for the low-risks or the lender
would have to be reduced.
It is the third option and the medium-risk types which create the distortion
in our model.4 Suppose the joint liability to the Þrm and the lender is set equal
to the actual damage costs. Then the low-risk types are those producing a social
surplus in expectation and they run the project. For the high-risk types the
project would yield a social loss, but they take the compensation. All this is
Þrst-best. However, for the medium types the project also yields a social loss and
for them the project is run with positive probability. This would not happen if
the accident probability were public information.
In Balkenborg (2001) we used a weighted version of the Nash bargaining solu-
tion (Nash (1950), Myerson (1991)) to solve the bargaining stage of the model. In
this paper we have to analyze a bargaining problem with incomplete information
to which the Nash bargaining solution does not apply. In particular, when the
Þrm has all the bargaining power we have a bargaining problem with an informed
principal (see Myerson (1983), Maskin and Tirole (1990) and Maskin and Tirole
(1992)). In this paper we use a weighted version of the neutral bargaining solu-
tion (Myerson (1983), Myerson (1984)) to solve the bargaining stage, primarily
because it is the most generally applicable solution concepts for such problems.
Technically, the determination of this solution is the main contribution of the
paper. The relation to other approaches is considered in Subsection 2.
Section 2 introduces the model and the notations. Section 3 determines the
weighted neutral bargaining solutions and compares it with other approaches.
Comparative statics results are given in Section 4. In the conclusions in Section
5 we discuss some limitations of our approach. The appendix contains most of
the proofs.
2 The model
A wealth-constrained risk-neutral Þrm with no own wealth would like to run an
environmentally risky project. This project requires an initial investment of size
  and would yield a gross proÞt ! +  . The net value of the project is hence
!. Since the Þrm has no own wealth she needs a loan to run the project. A risk
4The precise classiÞcation into low-risk, medium-risk and high risk types is part of the
deÞnition of the optimal contract and hence dependent on the joint liability.
4neutral lender with large but Þnite wealth " # 0 would be able to Þnance the
project.
As stated, the project is environmentally risky. With probability $ the project
might cause an environmental accident. An accident would be a pure externality
causing damage costs % # ! on potential victims. We assume that the wealth of
the lender plus the surplus generated by the project would be more than enough
to pay for the total damage costs, so ! + " # % # !.
The accident will not directly a ect the Þrm or the lender unless some form of
liability is imposed. We study here the e ects of a joint and strict liability & ! 0.
By this we mean that, if an accident occurs, the Þrm and the lender are liable
with all their joint wealth for the amount &. First the Þrm is liable with all her
wealth up to the amount &. If the Þrm cannot cover the full amount &, the lender
has to pay for the remainder. E ectively the joint liability cannot exceed ! +",
the total amount of cash available. Hence we assume & " ! +" in the following.
In this paper we study the case of adverse selection with respect to the accident
probability 0 " $ " 1. Thus the accident probability $ is the private knowledge
of the Þrm. Firms with di erent accident probabilities correspond to di erent
types of the Þrm. We consider here the case of Þnitely many types
0 " $0 ' $1 ' ··· ' $  ' ··· ' $! " 1
and denote by 0 ' (  " 1 the ex-ante probability for the Þrm to be of type $ .
Sometimes we refer to the index ) rather than the probability $  as “the type” of
the Þrm.
We assume either that there are only three types or that the following mono-
tone hazard rate condition is satisÞed for ) ' *:5




is decreasing in ). (1)
We consider here the case of a bilateral monopoly with a single Þrm and a
single lender. Admittedly, this analysis does not immediately carry over to a
scenario where several Þrms compete for a loan and / or where several lenders
compete to Þnance the project. The timing of the model is as follows:
1. The social planner announces the liability 0 " & " ! + ".
2. Nature selects with probability (  the level of safety $ = $  of the project
which is then revealed to the Þrm.
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!  . Thus our monotone hazard rate condition is the familiar
one from the literature (see, e.g., La ont and Martimort (2002)). It is made to ensure that it
su!ces to check the “local” incentive constraints (type   does not want to imitate type  +1 or
  1) in order to prove overall incentive compatibility. It turns out that we need this assumption
only when there are four types or more.
53. The lender and the Þrm bargain over a mechanism. Following the revelation
principle (Myerson (1979)), we assume that direct mechanisms are used.
4. If a mechanism is agreed upon, the Þrm announces a type ˆ   which, of course,
does not have to be her true type.
5. The direct mechanism determines the outcome conditional on the type ˆ  
announced by the Þrm. If the project is run, an accident occurs with
probability  . If an accident occurs, the joint and strict liability ! must be
paid.
In our case a direct mechanism can be described by a 4-tuple of functions6
" = ("(ˆ  ))0 ˆ   1 =
¡
#(ˆ  )$%
+ (ˆ  )$%
! (ˆ  )$%
0 (ˆ  )
¢
0 ˆ   1
If the Þrm announces to be of type ˆ  , i.e. if she claims that her project has
accident probability ˆ  , then #(ˆ  ) is the probability with which the project is
undertaken.
If, with probability 1   #(ˆ  )$ the project is not undertaken, the expected
Þnal wealth of the Þrm is %0 (ˆ  ). The lender loses this amount.
If, with probability #(ˆ  ), the project is undertaken, then the Þrm’s expected
Þnal wealth is %+ (ˆ  ) if no accident occurs and %! (ˆ  ) if an accident occurs. The
lender gains &   %+ (ˆ  ) or &   !   %! (ˆ  ), respectively.
The Þrm can only end up with a non-negative wealth, i.e. 0 ! %+ (ˆ  )$ %! (ˆ  )$
%0 (ˆ  ) must hold. Because the project generates at most the amount of capital &
and since the lender’s own wealth is ', we must overall impose the restrictions
0 ! #(ˆ  ) ! 1, 0 ! %+ (ˆ  ) ! & +', 0 ! %! (ˆ  ) ! & +'  ! and 0 ! %0 (ˆ  ) ! '
on the mechanism.
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denote the expected proÞt of the Þrm from the direct mechanism " if she is of
type   and announces to be of type ˆ  . Let
(! ("| ) = (
"
! ("$ | )
denote her expected utility from truthfully announcing her type. If all types
of the Þrm announce her type truthfully the expected proÞt to the lender is,
conditional on the Þrm being of type  ,
(" ("| ) = #( )(&    !)   (! ("| )
6Without loss of generality we can assume, whenever convenient, that the mechanism is






A mechanism is called incentive compatible if it satisÞes for all  , ˆ   " [0$1]
the incentive constraint
(! ("| ) # (! ("$ ˆ  | )
We assume that the reservation utility of the lender and of each type of the Þrm
is zero. To be individually rational the mechanism must hence satisfy the partic-
ipation constraint (" (") # 0 for the lender. Because the Þrm has no own wealth
the participation constraint (! ("| ) # 0 is automatically satisÞed when the non-
negativity constraints 0 ! %+ (ˆ  )$%! (ˆ  )$%0 (ˆ  ) hold. We call a mechanism
feasible if it is individually rational and incentive compatible.
It will be important to distinguish three types of interim e ciency. A mech-
anism " is interim e cient (among all types of all players) if it is feasible and
if there exists no feasible mechanism * such that (" (*) # (" (") and such that
(! (*| $) # (! ("| $) holds for all 0 ! + ! , whereby at least one of these
inequalities is strict. " is interim e cient for the Þrm if it is feasible and if
there exists no feasible mechanism * such that (! (*| $) # (! ("| $) holds for
all 0 ! + ! , whereby at least one of these inequalities is strict. In our model
(" (") = 0 must hold for all mechanisms " that are interim e cient for the Þrm.
Finally, a mechanism is interim e cient for the lender if it maximizes the proÞt
of the lender among all feasible mechanisms.7 In our model, mechanisms that are
interim e cient for the Þrm or the lender are also overall interim e cient.
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where #( $) is the probability that the project is run given the Þrm’s type and
given the direct mechanism chosen by the lender and the Þrm conditional on the
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. for . / 0
0 for . ! 0 0
7There is only one type of lender and hence no need to compromise between di erent types.
73 The Weighted Neutral Bargaining Solution
We start with a basic observation on incentive compatible (but not necessarily
individually rational) mechanisms.8
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is satisÞed for any 0 ! ˆ   1   ! 1.
b) The Þrm’s type contingent payo! (! ("| ) is convex in  , i.e.
(! ("| 0)   (! ("| )
 0    
!
(! ("| 00)   (! ("| 0)
 00    0
is satisÞed for all 0 !   1  0 1  00 ! 1.
c) The inequality
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1    
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is satisÞed for 0 ! ˆ   1   ! 1 while the inequality
(! ("| ) #
 
ˆ  
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is satisÞed for 0 !   1 ˆ   ! 1.
Proof. ad a and b) From the deÞnition of ("
! and (! we obtain for any   6= ˆ  
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and hence, since " is incentive compatible,
(! ("| )   (! ("|ˆ  ) #  #(ˆ  )(    ˆ  )
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(2)
Interchanging the roles of   and ˆ   we get
(! ("|ˆ  )   (! ("| ) #  #( )(ˆ      )
¡
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8Strictly speaking, the mechanism has only to be deÞned and to be incentive compatible
with respect to the values of ! in the support of the distribution of types. However, one can
always extend an incentive compatible mechanism   deÞned only for the types !0"··· "!  to
an incentive compatible mechanism  0 deÞned for all types 0   !   1 by choosing for any
0   !   1  0 (!) =  (ˆ !!) such that # 
" ( " ˆ !!|!) = max0!!!  # 
" ( "!!|!) .
8or
   (!|") !    (!|ˆ ")   !#(")(" ! ˆ ")
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Hence a) follows for ˆ " % " and then immediately b) follows for " % "0 % "00.
ad c) The deÞnition of    and the nonnegativity constraints on the mechanism
yield #(ˆ ")(1 ! ˆ ")$+ (ˆ ")      (!|ˆ "). From Inequality (2) we obtain for " & ˆ "
   (!|") !    (!|ˆ ") " !#(ˆ ")(" ! ˆ ")$
+ (ˆ ") " !
" ! ˆ "
1 ! ˆ "
   (!|ˆ ")
and    (!|") "
1 !
1 ˆ !   (!|ˆ "). Symmetrically #(ˆ ") ˆ "$  (ˆ ")      (!|ˆ ") and In-
equality (3) imply  1 (!|") "
!
ˆ ! 1 (!|ˆ ") for " % ˆ ".
Given any function ' (") " 0 that has all the properties described for the
function    (!|") in the lemma, it is not di cult to construct an incentive com-
patible mechanism ! with    (!|") = ' (") for all 0   "   1. Of course, the
mechanism may violate the participation constraint of the lender. Still, one
can construct a plethora of interim e cient mechanism where    (!|") is  -
shaped or increasing or constant in the accident probability ". In particular,
let ( ()) =
P"
#=0 *# (+ ! "#))
+ denote the ex-ante maximally available surplus for
the Þrm and the lender. Then the mechanism ! = (#,$+,$ ,$0) deÞned by
#(ˆ ") = 1 for ˆ " % +-), #(ˆ ") = 0 for ˆ " " +-), $+ (ˆ ") = $  (ˆ ") = $0 (ˆ ") = ( ())
for all 0   ˆ "   1 is interim e cient and distributes the gain ( ()) equally among
all types. Mechanism like these are implausible because they do not reward
productive types more than unproductive types.
To rule out such mechanisms and to select among the many interim e cient
mechanisms we use the concept of the neutral bargaining solution, due to Myer-
son (1983) and Myerson (1984). Myerson’s concept is an extension of the Nash
bargaining solution to bargaining problems with incomplete information. It is
based on an axiomatic approach and uses elements of both cooperative and non-
cooperative game theory. It is the solution concept with the smallest solution
sets satisfying the axioms described below. We use here a weighted version de-
pending on a parameter 0   .   1 which we interpret as the bargaining power
of the lender. The Þrm has bargaining power 1!.. The case . = 0 corresponds
to the case where the Þrm has all the bargaining power and can essentially make
a take-it-or-leave-it o!er to the lender. The neutral bargaining solution for this
case is developed in Myerson (1983). . = 0/5 is the case of equal bargaining
power discussed in Myerson (1984).
After we have described in this section the neutral bargaining solution and
the mechanisms it selects in our model, we will compare it to other reÞnement
approaches. I will take quite some freedom in describing the neutral bargaining
solution and its axiom, partly to give an alternative exposition of the ideas and
partly because some rephrasing is needed to Þt with the model here. Sometimes
9I have to be a bit vague because I do not want to develop Myerson’s general
framework. Readers familiar with Myerson’s papers will not Þnd it di cult to
verify the equivalence with his original formulations.
3.1 E ciency
Just as Nash required his bargaining solution to be Pareto-e cient, Myerson
requires that the neutral bargaining solution is interim e cient as an axiom.
If we expect the bargaining to end e ciently and if we assume that the Þrm
knows her types when bargaining, this is clearly the right notion of e ciency.
However, even if bargaining occurs ex-ante, before the Þrms learns her type,
interim e ciency seems appropriate if there is the possibility to renegotiate.
3.2 Strong Solutions and Random Dictatorship
a) Strong solutions for the Þrm are of interest if the Þrm has all the bargaining
power. A strong solution for the Þrm is a mechanism ! with the following three
properties:
1. The payo! to the lender from the mechanism neither depends on the type
announced by the Þrm nor on her true type:  $ (!) =  !
$ (!, ˆ "|") for all
0   ", ˆ "   1. At a strong solution, asymmetric information is not a problem.
2. The lender’s expected payo! is zero, as we would expect it if the Þrm has
all the bargaining power:  $ (!) = 0.
3. The mechanism is interim e cient for the Þrm.
There is general agreement that the strong solution, if it exists, is the ap-
propriate solution concept if the lender has all the bargaining power. It is an
interim e cient Rothschild-Stiglitz-Wilson allocation relative to the initial en-
dowment and yields hence the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome in
the three-stage game where the informed principal can make a take-it-or-leave-it
o!er to select among direct mechanisms (see Maskin and Tirole (1992), in partic-
ular Section 9). It is consistent with many equilibrium reÞnements for this game
(see Myerson (1983), Theorem 1 and Maskin and Tirole (1992), Proposition 7).
The next axiom imposed by Myerson is hence: A strong solution for the Þrm
is the neutral bargaining solution if the Þrm has all the bargaining power.
If the joint liability ) does not exceed the net value of the project, our model
has a strong solution. Namely, the Þrm always pays for the liability herself and
pays exactly the investment costs 0 back to the lender. The lender makes zero
proÞt and his deep pockets are not employed for liability payments. Formally,










strong solution for the Þrm and hence the neutral bargaining solution for the Þrm:
#0 (ˆ ") = 1, $
+
0 (ˆ ") = +, $
 
0 (ˆ ") = + ! ) for all 0   ˆ "   1.
b) Because there is only one type of lender, the strong solution for the lender
(and hence the neutral bargaining solution if the lender has all the bargaining
power) is the mechanism which maximizes his expected payo! among all feasible
mechanisms. In our model it is the following simple mechanism where the lender
appropriates all surplus.
Proposition 3 The strong solution for the lender (and hence the neutral bar-










deÞned by #1 (ˆ ") = 1 if +!ˆ ") & 0, #1 (ˆ ") = 0 if +!ˆ ") % 0,
$
+
1 (ˆ ") = $
 
1 (ˆ ") = $0
1 (ˆ ") = 0 for 0   ˆ "   1.
c) For intermediate bargaining power it is not clear what a “strong solution”
should be. Myerson (1984) avoids the problem with his “random dictatorship”
axiom, which extends to arbitrary bargaining power 0   .   1 as follows:
If !0 is a strong solution for the Þrm and !1 a strong solution for the lender,
then the randomized mechanism (1 ! .)!0+.!1, where !0 is played with proba-
bility 1!. and !1 with probability ., is, if interim e cient, the weighted neutral
bargaining solution for the bargaining power . of the lender.
It follows immediately




neutral bargaining solution when the lender has bargaining power 0   .   1:
#% (ˆ ") = 1, $+
% (ˆ ") = (1 ! .)+ and $ 
% (ˆ ") = (1 ! .)(+ ! )).
Thus the project is always run and the proceeds, whatever they are, are
divided according to the bargaining power.
3.3 Extended Models and Limits
When the joint liability ) exceeds the net value + of the project, a strong solution
for the Þrm does not exist for our model. When strong solutions do not exist,
Myerson’s idea is to look at extensions of the model for which a strong solution
exists. He shows that there exists always an interim e cient mechanism ! of
the original model for which one can Þnd a sequence of extended models with
strong solutions that approach in the limit the given mechanism “from below”. A
neutral bargaining solution for . = 0 is any mechanism that can be approached
in this way.
It su ces to consider here only extensions of our model where a “safe project”
1 is added that always gives the lender zero regardless of the type of Þrm,
2$ (1|") = 0 for all 0   "   1, and where the payo! to the Þrm 2  (1|")
can be dependent on the type, but not on any announcements of types. 1 is
11thus trivially a feasible mechanism. Provided it is interim e cient, it is a strong
solution. A general mechanism of the extended model is in our case given by Þve
functions (3(ˆ "),#(ˆ "),$+ (ˆ "),$  (ˆ "),$0 (ˆ ")) where 1!3(ˆ ") is the probability
with which the safe project 1 is chosen if the Þrm announces to be of type ˆ " and
where (#(ˆ "),$+ (ˆ "),$  (ˆ "),$0 (ˆ ")) determines, with the same interpretations
as for the original model, what happens if 1 is not chosen. To connect the
original model with the extended model, we need the following Independence of
Irrelevant Alternatives axiom: If the mechanism ! of the original model is not
a neutral bargaining solution of the extended model, then it is also not a neutral
bargaining solution of the original model.
Next we have to consider a sequence of extensions for each integer 4 =
1,2,3,///. The extensions in the sequence di!er only with respect to the type-
dependent payo!s 2&
  (1|") which the Þrm gets from the safe project 1. We can
assume that these payo!s converge to a limit lim&"# 2&
  (1|") = 2  (1|"). To
connect the solutions in the sequence of models with the solution for the limit
model we impose the following continuity axiom: Suppose that !% is an interim
e cient mechanism of the limit model and that the 4-th model in the sequence
has the neutral bargaining solution !&









  2  (!%|") holds for all 0   "   1,
!% is a weighted neutral bargaining solution for the bargaining power . of the
limit model.9
The natural way to Þnd the neutral bargaining solution for . = 0 is to ap-
proximate a solution candidate “from below” by a sequence of strong solutions in
extended models. Only very few mechanisms can be approximated in this way,
which is why Myerson’s approach selects very sharply among the mechanisms.
It may be instructive to see in the simplest setting why the mechanism !
which distributes the surplus equally among all types cannot be approximated
from below. Suppose there are only two types. For the low-risk type 5 = 0 the
accident probability is "0 is zero, for the high-risk type 5 = 1 it is strictly positive.
Assume that the joint liability exceeds the net value of the project () & +)
but that it is still worthwhile for the high-risk type to produce (+ ! "1) & 0).
Suppose the mechanism ! described above where both types get ( ()) = *0+ +
*1 (+ ! "1)) could be approached by strong solutions from below. Suppose Þrst
that lim&"# 2&
  (1|"1) & (1 ! "1)( ()). Then the following mechanism would
Pareto-dominate 1 in all extended models for large 4. If the Þrm announces to
be of the low-risk type, the original project is run. The Þrm receives ( ()) + 6 if
no accident occurs and zero otherwise. If she announces to be of the high risk
type, the safe project 1 is selected. Hereby 6 & 0 is chosen such that 2&
  (1|"1) &
(1 ! "1)(( ()) + 6) for large 4. This mechanism is feasible in the extended models
9Myerson (1984) imposes an additional probability invariance axiom which we do not need
here and which I therefore skip.
12and gives the low-risk type ( ()) + 6 for arbitrarily large 4. This contradicts the
assumption that 1 is interim e cient and lim&"# 2&
  (1|"0)   ( ()).
So we must have lim&"#2&
  (1|"1)   (1 ! "1)( ()). However, then we can
consider a mechanism where the original project is always run and where both
types get ( ()) + 6, with 6 & 0 su ciently small, if no accident occurs and
zero otherwise. We have lim&"# 2&
  (1|"0) % ( ()) + 6 and lim&"# 2&
  (1|"1) %
(1 ! "1)(( ()) + 6) for large 4. Moreover, (*0 + *1 (1 ! "1))(( ()) + 6) % ( ()) for
small 6 & 0. Thus we obtain the contradiction that for 4 large 1 is not interim
e cient for the Þrm.
3.4 Characterization of the Neutral Bargaining Solution
for ) & +.
To Þnd, Þrst for . = 0, the neutral bargaining solution of the original model we
want to choose the payo!s 2&






  (1|")   2  (!|")
holds for a mechanism ! of the original model. ! is then the neutral bargaining
solution if the Þrm has all the bargaining power. The numbers 7(") are called
warranted claims.
Since types are ordered by the accident probability in our model it is not
surprising that we can determine the warranted claims jointly with the neutral
bargaining solution in an inductive procedure starting with the highest risk type.
To do this, recall that we have only Þnitely many types "0,...,"" in our model.
For any type 0   5   8 we call the following model the 5-bargaining problem.
The model di!ers from the given one only in the prior over the types. The new
prior (*#
') is the posterior to which the lender would update if he learned that the





0 for 0     ! "
  
 !+!!!+ " for "       #
Theorem 5 The neutral bargaining solutions $0"# in the "-bargaining problems
when the Þrm has all the bargaining power and the warranted claims %(&#) are
inductively deÞned for " = #'# ! 1'((('0 as follows:
$0"# is the feasible mechanism in the "-bargaining problem that maximizes type
&#’s expected payo  among all feasible mechanisms that give all types   ) " at
least their warranted claims %(&$) as expected payo . Type "’s warranted claim
is his expected payo  in the mechanism $0"#.
In particular, %(&%) = (* ! &%+)
+.
Notice that the theorem implies Proposition 2 for the case * ) +. For + ) *
we obtain the following result. Recall that a type "0 with "0 ) " can guarantee
13himself in any incentive compatible mechanism a fraction
1 &!0
1 &! of the expected
payo  of type ".
Proposition 6 Suppose * ! +. Then the warranted claims satisfy %(&#) = 0 for





Therefore the neutral bargaining solution when the Þrm has all the bargaining
power is the mechanism that maximizes the expected payo  of type " = 0 among
all feasible mechanisms.
We give next a more explicit description of this mechanism. This mechanism
is basically an option contract with three options. The Þrst option is chosen by
low-risk types " ! "1, the second by medium-risk types "1   " ! "2 and the third
by high-risk types "2   "( Hereby "1 and "2 are chosen as follows. If no " with
* !&#+   0 exists (so the project yields a gain for all types), set "1 = "2 = # +1.
Otherwise, let "1 be the smallest index with * ! &#+   0 and deÞne "2 as the
smallest integer for which
,# (* ! &#+) + (&#+1 ! &#)(* + -)
% X
$=#+1
,$   0 (4)




















#=0 ,# (* ! &#+)
+
P%
#=0 /# (1 ! &!
#)
and let .0 = (1 ! &#2).+
Theorem 7 The neutral bargaining solution $0 when the Þrm has all the bargain-
ing power is for + ) * the following mechanism (0(&)'.0 (&)'.+ (&)'.  (&)):
1. 0(&#) = 1, .+ (&#) = .+, .  (&#) = 0 for 0   " ! "1.
2. 0(&#) = *+
(+), .+ (&#) = * + -, .  (&#) = .0 (&#) = 0 for "1   " ! "2.
3. 0(&#) = 0, .0 (&#) = .0 for "2   "   #.
14The following Þgure shows the expected gain 1+ ($0'&) of each type of the
Þrm in this mechanism. The graph of this function is piecewise linear with a kink















The mechanism is an option contract with the following three options:
• One option is to run the project with certainty and to receive the net
payment .+ ) 0 when no accident occurs and zero otherwise. This is the
option chosen by all low-risk types " ! "1 for whom the project yields a
gain in expectation (* !&+ " 0). Because this option is always available to
the Þrm, each type & of the Þrm must gain at least .+ (1 ! &).
• Another option is not to run a project and to receive a compensation. This
is the option chosen by the high-risk types with accident probability & " &#2.
For these types running the project would yield a loss (* ! &+ ! 0). If the
compensation .0 would not be o ered in exchange for not running the
project, these types would choose to run the project negligently since they
have no own money at stake and can hence only win. The compensation
is chosen such that type "2 is indi erent between running the project and
taking the compensation. Since the size of the compensation cannot be
conditioned on the accident probability, the graph of 1+ ($0'&) is ßat for
& " &#2.
• The types "1 ! " ! "2 are of “medium risk”. For them the project is run
with a small probability 0 = *+
(+), in which case they receive all available
wealth * + -. Running the project for this type brings a loss (* ! &+ !
0) and therefore the project is run only with a small probability. If it
is run and no accident occurs, the Þrm wins the maximal available prize
*+-. This lottery is chosen such that the medium-risk types are indi erent
between accepting the contract with the lottery and accepting the contract
15for the low-risk types. With both contracts they would gain (1 ! &).+
in expectation. In equilibrium they select the one with the lower accident
probability.
The medium types are not “bribed out of business” because they require
a higher compensation than the high-risk types. Since any compensation
given to them can also be taken up by the high-risk types, it is, from the
perspective of the low-risk types, cheaper to keep them working than to
bribe them out of business. Even better is the described lottery.
When determining the solution, the interesting part is to determine "2, i.e. to
Þnd out which types who run a loss (* ! &+ ! 0) should play the “lottery” and
which ones should be bribed out of business. Thanks to the monotone hazard
rate condition (1), this critical number "2 is determined by the inequality (4).
Example 1 Although our analysis is restricted to the case of Þnitely many types,
we can, for instance, approximate the uniform distribution of types by setting
&# = #
% and ,# = 1
%+1 (" = 0'··· '#) and then take the limit # # $. In the limit
&#1 converges to *2+' &#2 to 2(+)
(+'+) and .+ to
*2 (* + + + -)
*2 + +2 + +(+ ! *) + +-
Since 2(+)
(+'+) ) (
' there is in the limit for + ) * always an interval of medium-risk
types for whom the project is run with positive probability.
We have now described the neutral bargaining solutions $0 when the Þrm has
all the bargaining power and $1 when the lender has all the bargaining power. It
is not di!cult to show that the mechanism $, := (1 ! 3)$0+3$1, where nature
chooses with probabilities 1 ! 3 and 3 between the two mechanisms $0 and $1,
is interim e!cient. The random dictatorship axiom hence implies:
Proposition 8 The neutral bargaining solution when the lender has bargaining
power 0   3   1 is the mechanism $, just described.
3.5 Comparison with Other Approaches
3.5.1 Bargaining before the private information is received
Does the Þrm learn the accident probability before or after she bargains with
the lender? Both scenarios are meaningful in our model, although the neutral
bargaining solution seems to be tailored for bargaining problems where the Þrm
already has her private information.
Let us again consider the case where the Þrm has all the bargaining power and
let us suppose that she can make a take-it-or-leave-it o er before she learns her
16type. She is restricted, however to propose interim e!cient contracts. Ex ante all
the Þrm cares about is her expected payo  averaged over all her possible types.
The maximal payo  she can gain is 4 (+) =
P%
#=0 ,# (* ! &#+)
+ and this maximum
is, for instance, achieved with the mechanism $ where 4 (+) is distributed equally
among all types. It is hence an equilibrium if the Þrm proposes this mechanism
and the lender accepts. Any other ex-ante e!cient feasible mechanism gives an
equilibrium as well. The neutral bargaining solution is, however, not ex-ante
e!cient whenever there exist “medium-risk” types who are not “bribed our of
business” and for whom the project yields a loss (* ! &+ ! 0). Thus the results
from bargaining ex-ante seem to conßict with the neutral bargaining solution.
However, this argument does not take account of the possibility of renegoti-
ation. Suppose ex-ante bargaining has led to the mechanism where the surplus
is shared equally between all types. Now the Þrm gets her private information
and learns that her project has a very low accident probability. She could then
address the lender and propose the neutral bargaining solution $0. Since middle-
and high-risk types can only lose if this proposal gets accepted, the lender should
infer that he is facing a low-risk type Þrm and accept the o er. (After having
excluded the possibility that high-risk types would make such an o er, he would
actually expect to win.)
Thus the simple bargaining model where a party makes an o er ex-ante before
learning her type can give interesting insights (see La ont and Martimort (2002)
for examples), but it is problematic if renegotiation could lead to a mechanism
that is not ex-ante e!cient. Once renegotiation is taken into account, the sim-
plicity of the ex-ante approach is lost and it may be easier to analyze the interim
bargaining problem, after the type has been revealed.
3.5.2 Perfect Bayesian Equilibria
Maskin and Tirole (1990) and Maskin and Tirole (1992) characterize perfect
Bayesian equilibria in the three-stage game where an informed principal can make
a take-it-or leave-it o er for the (direct) mechanism to be selected. Their analysis
is based on the Rothschild-Stiglitz-Wilson allocation (short: RSW allocation).
As remarked above, their approach also selects the strong solution as the unique
perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome for + ! *. However, when the joint liability
+ exceeds the net value * of the project, results for the RSW allocation relative to
the “no deal” allocation, where the lender gets zero for every type, are somewhat
disappointing.10 In particular, when there are types with accident probability less
than 1 for whom the project does not yield a gain (*!&+ ! 0), the RSW allocation
gives zero to each type of the Þrm. This is so because in any feasible mechanism
where one type of the Þrm makes a positive gain, the types for whom the project
yields a loss must also gain a positive amount because they can imitate. In any
10Further insights, though, might be obtained from studying the renegotiation game discussed
in Maskin and Tirole (1992) and RSW allocations relative to other intial allocations.
17such mechanism the lender must hence make a loss on the highest-risk type.
Since the lender must get at least zero in the RSW allocation conditional on
each type, each type of the Þrm must gain zero. The results of Maskin and Tirole
(1992) imply that every feasible mechanism of the model yields a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium in the three-stage game. The RSW allocation is interim e cient for
the Þrm and it is the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the three-stage if
and only if the prior puts positive probability only on types of the Þrm for whom
the project generates a loss. The equilibrium is then, of course, the one where
trade never occurs ( (!) = 0 and "0 (!) = 0 for all !).
When there are only types for whom the project yields a gain, the results
have a little more structure. In the RSW allocation the lender cannot make a
loss on the highest type #, so the highest risk type cannot gain more than $ ! %.
Lemma 1 c) implies that the RSW allocation yields
1 ! 
1 !! ($   ! %) for type &. The
following simple calculation shows that the RSW allocation is interim e cient
(and so the three-stage game has a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium) if and




1   !"
1   ! 
($   ! %) !
  X
"=0




1   !"
(!    !")(%   $) ! 0
whereby equality occurs if and only if !" = !  for all & and hence # = 0.
If there is more than one type, every feasible mechanism which Pareto-
dominates for all types of the Þrms the RSW allocation yields an equilibrium
outcome for the three-stage game. Again, the selection is not su ciently strong
to allow for an insightful comparative statics analysis.
3.5.3 ReÞnements for Signalling Games
The three-stage game just discussed is a signalling game. The Þndings in this
subsection suggest that there is indeed a connection between Myerson’s weighted
bargaining solution and the reÞnement concepts for signalling games discussed
in the literature. We need, however, a fairly strong reÞnement criterion, namely
the FGP criterion based on Farrell (1985) and Grossman and Perry (1986) as dis-
cussed in Maskin and Tirole (1992), Section 5B. The relation to other reÞnement
criteria needs further research.
The consistency of the neutral bargaining solution (0 with the FGB criterion
follows in the case $ ! % from Proposition 7 in Maskin and Tirole (1992). The
explicit description of the neutral bargaining solution for % ) $ implies:
Lemma 9 Let ( be any interim e cient mechanism for the Þrm di!erent from
(0, the neutral bargaining solution if the lender has no bargaining power. Then
there exists a type 0 * & ! # with $   !"% ) 0 such that +# ((|!$) ! +# ((0|!$)
for all , * & and +# ((|!$) ) +# ((0|!$) for all , # &.
18As a straightforward consequence of the deÞnitions and the lemma we obtain.
Proposition 10 Consider the three stage game, where Þrst the Þrm can propose
a mechanism which is interim e cient for the Þrm, the lender can then accept or
reject and thereafter the proposed mechanism, if accepted, is implemented. Then
the neutral bargaining solution (0 when the Þrm has all the bargaining power is the
only pure strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome of this game consistent
with the FGP criterion.
Proof. We show Þrst that (0 deÞnes such an equilibrium. This equilibrium is
as follows. All types of the Þrm propose (0. The lender accepts this mechanism.
If the Þrm would deviate and propose a di!erent interim e cient mechanism
(, the lender would update his believes by assuming that all types who would
strictly gain by having ( rather that (0 accepted have an equal likelihood to have
deviated. Let & be the type determined for ( and (0 in the previous lemma.
The lender’s posterior is then given by {'"
$} from the &-bargaining problem. This
belief is consistent with the FGP criterion. Since ( is interim e cient for the
Þrm, the lender expects to break even when ( is played given his initial prior. He
expects to make a loss from ( given his posterior. (The types , * & are the most
productive and they gain even less in ( than in (0. Since his posterior rules out
these types, he must expect to make a loss.) Hence it is optimal for him to reject.
Thus the described behavior describes a perfect Bayesian equilibrium consistent
with the FGP criterion.
Consider now a perfect Bayesian equilibrium consistent with the FGP criterion
where an interim e cient mechanism ( is o!ered. Suppose the Þrm deviates and
o!ers (0 instead. The FGP criterion then requires the lender to update his belief
by assuming that the deviation must have come with probability zero from the
types who gain less in (0 than in (, with equal probability from the types who
gain more in (0 than in ( and with an equal or possibly lower probability from
types who are indi!erent. Since, by the lemma, he is eliminating only high risk
types from his belief by updating, he expects to strictly gain in expectation by
accepting (0. The equilibrium must, by the FGP criterion, hence be such that he
accepts (0. However, then we cannot have an equilibrium because the lowest-risk
type would always deviate and propose (0. This is a contradiction.
One can similarly “justify” the neutral bargaining solution for the bargaining
power - by assuming that the Þrm must o!er an interim e cient mechanism that
gives the lender at least the fraction - of the maximally available surplus.
4 The Optimal Liability
We can now present our main result concerning the optimal joint liability in the
pure adverse selection case studied here.
19Theorem 11 Either a full or a punitive joint liability maximizes social welfare.
In particular, the deep pockets of the lender have to be employed to achieve the
social optimum.
Proof. The neutral bargaining solution is described in Theorems 7 and 8.
Assume that initially the full liability % = . ) $ is imposed and then gets
reduced to a liability ˜ % # $. (The case ˜ % * $ is obvious.) Initially, the project
is run with certainty only if it is socially worthwhile, i.e., when $   !. # 0 Let
us write &1 (%), &2 (%), and "+ (%) to indicate the dependence of these numbers
on %. It is immediate that &1 (%) and &2 (%) are weakly increasing in %. We must
have "+ (˜ %) ) "+ (.) because, by Theorem 6, "+ (˜ %) is the solution to a less
constrained optimization problem than "+ (.) (i.e., the same objective function
is maximized over a smaller set). For all types & with $   !"% # 0 the project is
run with certainty both at the liabilities . and ˜ %/ for types &2 (˜ %) ! & it is never
run. For all other types the probability of running the project increases from 0 to
(1   -)
%+(˜ &)
'+( or 1 or from (1   -)
%+())
'+( to (1   -)
%+(˜ &)
'+( or 1.Thus social welfare
cannot increase and hence either a full or a joint liability must be optimal.
Whether the optimal joint liability is strictly punitive or just equal to the
damage costs is harder to say in general. If &1 (.) = &2 (.) then full liability is
optimal because it yields Þrst best since
P 
"=0 '" ($   !".)
+ is the maximal social
welfare. This is, for instance, always the case when there are only two types.
Due to the discreetness of the type space we can, however, not deduce that the
optimal liability is unique. The range of optimal liabilities may contain values
above and below the damage costs, at least one value cannot be below.
To avoid these integer problems, let us look at the uniform distribution of
types as a limit, as described in Example 1.11 For this example we are going
to show that a) the optimal liability is strictly punitive unless the lender has all
the bargaining power and b) the optimal liability is decreasing and social welfare
increasing in the bargaining power of the lender, at least as long as the optimal
liability does not jump discontinuously.
We write 01 = $1%/ for the limit of !"1 and 02 = 2'+(
'+&+( for the limit
of !"2. 01 (%) and 02 (%) are strictly increasing since
*+1
*& =   '
&2 * 0 and
*+2
*& =   2'+(
('+&+() * 0. We have "+ =
'2('+&+()
'2+&2+&(& ')+&( and hence *%+
*& =
 $2 2&2+4&' 2'2+4&(+(2
('2+2&2 &'+&()
2 * 0.
When, for % ) $/ the weighted neutral bargaining solution for the bargaining
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and substitution shows *,-
*& |&=) ) 0 as long as - * 1. Since the proof of the
previous proposition still applies here, it follows that the optimal liability must
be strictly punitive unless the lender has all the bargaining power. Since . ) $,
it is always optimal to employ the deep pockets of the lender.
I have not yet been able to show that the social welfare function is quasi-
concave. Therefore the following argument is correct only as long as there is no
discontinuous jump in the optimal joint liability % (and *2,-
*&2 * 0 holds at the
optimum).
Let %! ) . denote the optimal liability given as a solution to the Þrst-order
condition *,-
*& = 0. *,-
*& takes the form 7 + (1   -)8 where 7 and 8 do not
depend on -. At the optimum 7 is positive since %! ) . and so 8 * 0 for - * 1
from the Þrst-order condition. Since *2,-
*.*& =  8 ) 0 the envelope theorem
implies that social welfare is (at least locally) increasing in -. Since *2,-
*&2 * 0









i.e., the optimal joint liability is decreasing in the bargaining power - of the lender.
5 Conclusion
We have been able to determine the weighted neutral bargaining solution for an
adverse selection model where lenders lend to wealth-constrained Þrms who could
cause a severe environmental accident. We have seen how adverse selection can
create a distortion away from Þrst-best because in the contract selected by the
lender and the Þrm the potentially hazardous project is undertaken at a loss for
medium-risk types of the Þrm in order to avoid the large compensation payments
needed to deter these types from running the project. Overall, the comparative
statics of the model considered here is simpler, but in sharp contrast to the
comparative statics in Balkenborg (2001) for the moral hazard problem.
The analysis has a number of limitations. First of all, it is still a conjecture
that the weighted neutral bargaining solution is unique for this model. Secondly,
the conclusions would not be as extreme if the Þrm had some small amount of
own capital to lose from running the project. This more realistic assumption
was avoided here to keep the analysis simple. Thirdly, our analysis is made for
21a bilateral monopoly and it is not obvious how it extends to the case of several
lenders and Þrms in competition.
A Proofs
For %     we apply Theorem 4 of Myerson (1984) to verify that we have indeed
found the neutral bargaining solutions. We will not address the question of
uniqueness of the neutral bargaining solution.
Because all types of each player are risk neutral, every mechanism ! =
("(#)$%+ (#)$%  (#)$%0 (#))0! !1 is payo  equivalent to a lottery
(!(&!|#")) 1   5
1 ! " over the following six mechanisms.
&0: The project is not run and everyone gets zero. '# (&0|#") = '$ (&0|#") = 0;
&1: The project is not run and the Þrm receives all available cash. '# (&1|#") = (,
'$ (&1|#") = !(;
&2: The project is run and the lender gets all available wealth. '# (&2|#") = 0,
'$ (&2|#") =   ! #");
&3: The project is run and the Þrm gets all available wealth if no accident occurs
but nothing otherwise. '# (&3|#") = (1 ! #")(  + (), '$ (&2|#") = #" (  ! )) !
(1 ! #")(;
&4: The project is run and the Þrm gets all available wealth if an accident occurs
but nothing otherwise. '# (&3|#") = #" (  + ( ! )), '$ (&2|#") = !#"(+(1 ! #") ;
&5: The project is run and the Þrm gets all available wealth. '# (&5|#") =   +
( ! #"), '$ (&2|#") = !(.
With some abuse of notation we write ! = (!(&!|#")) 0   5
1 ! " .






0!"!& be a strictly positive vector of weights with
+
%
" " 0 for * " #. Moreover, we assume +
%
" , -" with -" as in deÞned subsection
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with given .%
0   0 among all individually rational and incentive compatible mech-
anisms is interim e!cient. The Lagrangian for this linear programming problem
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provided the only binding constraints are the incentive constraints requiring that
type 3 + 1 cannot gain from imitating type 3 and vice versa. Hereby we use the
convention .%
&+1 = 01 = 0 and obtain from the deÞnitions12
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for 31 $ 3 , 32
0 else























23Lemma 12 With these choices we have







1 (&2|#") = 1 (&3|#") for 0 $ 3 , 31
1 (&0|#") = 1 (&3|#") for 31 $ 3 , 32
1 (&0|#") = 1 (&1|#") for 32 $ 3 $ 4
Proof. We leave it to the reader to check that max4!!!5 1 (&!|#") $
max0!!!3 1 (&!|#"). We calculate 1 (&1|#") and 1 (&3|#") using the recursive for-
mula for .%
".
Suppose 0 $ 3 , 31. Then 0
%
" = 0. We obtain 1 (&1|#") , 0 and 1 (&3|#") =
 !#") from the recursion formula, -" = 2" and the second expression for 1 (&3|#")
above.





















! and therefore 1 (&3|#") = 0 whereas
1 (&1|#") =
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Suppose 32 $ 3 $ 4. Then .%
" = 2" ! +
%
" + .%
"+1 and so 1 (&1|#") = 0 whereas
1 (&3|#") = 2" (  ! #")) + (#"+1 ! #").
%
"+1 (  + () , 05
We can choose now 6%
# (#") and 6%
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As * " # we obtain the limits .%
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for 31 $ 3 , 32
0 else
and 6%




6# (#") = (1 ! .)2" (  ! #"))
+ + ."+16# (#"+1) ! 0"6# (#" 1)
24from which we obtain as a unique solution (since (  ! #"))
+ = 0 whenever 0" 6= 0)
."6# (#") = (1 ! .)
& X
'="
2' (  ! #'))
+










1 (&!|#") = /$ (!-)
6# (#0) = (1 ! #0)
(1 ! .)
P&
"=0 2" (  ! #"))
+
P&
"=0 -" (1 ! #"
")
= /# (!-|#")
Since !- is interim e!cient (see the argument below), it follows from Theorem 4
in Myerson (1984) that !- is a neutral bargaining solution if 6# (#") $ /# (!-|#")
holds for all 3.
To verify this, notice that our notation corresponds to the one used in My-
erson’s theorem as follows. We use #" instead of 3! to indicate types. For the
lowest risk-type #0 we write +
%
0 + .%
0 instead of +




% (#"). Our analysis assumes that .% (#"|#"0) is zero except
when 30 = 3 + 1 or 30 = 3 ! 1 and so we have write .%
" instead of .% (#"|#" 1) and







For all 3   31 we have 6# (#") = 0 , /# (!-|#"). Now suppose 3 , 31. Then
/# (!-|#") =
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1  0/# (!-|#0) =
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Except for the interim e!ciency of !- we have now shown that !- is the weighted
neutral bargaining solution.
For the remaining arguments of the paper one has to consider variants of the
Lagrangian


















26and observe that the    (!!|"") (for the relevant #) together with the Lagrangian
multipliers #" and $", as calculated above, form admissible solutions for a vari-
ety of maximization problems and their duals. By the duality theory for linear
programming they are hence solutions to the respective optimization problems.
In this way we can show, for instance, that    maximizes %# ( |"0) subject to
%$ ( )   #& (') and the incentive constraints. This completes together with the
above lengthy calculation Proposition 6 and we obtain in turn Theorem 5. By
Þxing the values of %# ( |"%) and %$ ( |"%), the dual variables #% etc. for all ( ) *
with a given * one can similarly show that    maximizes the lenders expected
payo  in the *-bargaining problem subject to the incentive constraints and the
constraint that type * gets at least %# (  |""). From this result it follows imme-
diately that    is interim e!cient. This line of arguments can also be used to
derive Lemma 9.
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